Friday, March 03, 2006
The Orioles vs. The AL
OFFENSE
- R/G: Bal- 4.5/AL- 4.76
Boy, that's ugly. Only four teams in the AL scored less runs per game than the Orioles (and none from the AL East): Minnesota, Kansas City, Detroit, and Seattle. Minnesota has a top-line pitching staff, Seattle plays in a notorious pitchers park, we barely edged Detroit (4.46 R/G), and Kansas City... well, there's something wrong if you take solace in that.
So, exactly what components of run production did the Orioles fall short in?
- BA: Bal- .269/AL- .268
The O's were able to keep up with the league's pace in batting average. Unfortunately, batting average has little correlation with scoring runs. In broad terms, BA's value is essentially limited to its impact on OBP.
- OBP: Bal- .327/ AL- .333
I have to admit, this isn't as bad as I expected. Still, the Orioles had the lowest OBP of any team in the AL East and trailed New York (.355) and Boston (.357) by thirty points. In fact, those two teams led the entire AL in OBP (and R/G... if you catch my drift).
- SLG: Bal- .434/ AL- .424
There we go. Let's just hope those ten points weren't propped up by B-12.
- P/PA (Pitches per plate appearance): Bal- 3.65/ AL- 3.74
Only Tampa Bay saw fewer pitches per plate appearance than the Orioles in the AL. The average AL team had 38.3 PA's per game, the Orioles- 37.9. With some pretty easy math, it becomes apparent that opposing pitchers were able to throw about 5 less pitches per game against the Orioles than the average AL team; and 844 fewer pitches on the season.
Often times, people can see the value of taking pitches for the intrinsic value of a base on balls. Here, we see an example of a team that hurt itself by not taking pitches and allowing opposing starters to pitch deeper into games.
- GB/FB: Bal- 1.17/AL- 1.26
This certainly helps explain the O's above-average SLG %. After all, it's pretty difficult to round the bases when you're hitting wormburners like Hideki Matsui circa 2003.
Defense/ Pitching
- DER (Defense Efficiency Rating): Bal- .693/AL- .696
Right around league-average. (DER is the rate at which a defense converts balls in play into outs. Its reciprocal is the pitching staff's BA/BIP)
- RA/9: Bal- 5.05/AL- 4.74; ERA: Bal- 4.57/AL- 4.35; DIPS 3.0: Bal- 4.75/AL- 4.73
What's interesting here is that although the Orioles trailed well behind the rest of the AL is traditional measures like RA/9 and ERA, they were roughly league average according to the superior measure of performance- DIPS 3.0.
Why is that?
- LD%: Bal- 20%/AL- 19.6%; HR/FB: Bal- 13%/AL- 12%
As I've explained before, both of these measures are highly influenced by luck. In neither category were the O's well above the league average (ie unlucky), but the combined effects of the two certainly help explain the difference between traditional measures of the pitching staff's performance and the more accurate DIPS 3.0.
- K/9: Bal- 6.4/AL- 6.1; BB/9: Bal- 3.6/ AL- 3.0
No surprises here. The Orioles tied the White Sox for third in the AL in K rate. Unfortunately, they also finished just behind Tampa Bay for highest BB rate. Daniel Cabrera was a key contributor in both categories, and helps demonstrate both the potential and the volatility of the Oriole's pitching staff.
- GB/FB: Bal- 1.37/AL- 1.25
This is certainly promising. Again Daniel Cabrera (1.78) was a key contributor; as were Todd Williams (3.59), Steve Kline (1.96), and Sidney Ponson (1.93). You can probably tell from the latter two examples that inducing ground balls is not enough on its own to effectively retire major league hitters.
Conclusion
There's certainly a lot here to mull over, but there are two things that jump out to me.
Offensively, the Orioles have to make pitchers work harder this year. 5 pitches per game may not seem like a lot, but that is essentially one and a half extra plate appearances per game that opposing pitchers are getting through with only their typical exertion.
On the other side of the ball, it's no secret that Orioles pitchers have got to cut down on the walks. Still, what surprised me was how average the team was by DIPS 3.0 standards, even when other measures say otherwise. I'd expect an overall improvement in the rotation just from the expulsion of Sidney Ponson (which should outweigh the loss of B.J. Ryan- in more ways than one). But, now we can now expect those improvements over a baseline that is roughly league-average, as opposed to merely expecting improvements from a below-average staff.
OTOH, if Mazzone can harness the control of Cabrera and Bedard, we could be watching something real special...
One of the things I'm hearing Mazzone mention is telling Cabrera to get rid of his two-seamer, the FB that trades off some velocity for more movement, and relying more on his straighter four-seam fastball. To me this is a message that control is critical. This sounds like great advice. Many pitchers have found success throwing mainly four-seam fastballs, only to break out the two-seamer for "special" situations.
vL: 285/400/481/880 (337 ABs)
vR: 174/256/221/478 (276 ABs)
Interestingly enough, in 2004 the OPSa variant was practically nil:
vL: 249/345/399/744 (293 ABs)
vR: 270/369/367/736 (267 ABs)
I don't really know what to make of it. When I saw that enormous lefty/righty split in OBP, I started to wonder if it wasn't an approach or a mental thing. I guess it could easily the rotation and location of his FB, though. I would love to see the 2005 OPSa vR and at least the 2004 OPSa vL.
Kilbs- Great info on Cabrera's platoon splits. I'll see if I can't go scrounging for any info on what sections of the strike zone Cabrera hits most effectively (or at least most often). Coupled with your platoon info, that should help us see what the problem is.
The thing that baffles me is that each of the last two winters I have read reports saying that Cabrera's off-seson priority was developing hi9s change. I don't really understand why he wouldn't keep working on it in ST. Now that he has left for the WBC, I doubt he will be anxious to try it out on the international stage.
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